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In the same time period over which the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia became freer, measured inequality of income for those countries increased. 
Researchers linked the increase to the egalitarian values of socialism and to the process of 
economic and political liberalization. We question that link, because we question whether 
socialism was egalitarian.  The inequalities in socialism were hidden but, nevertheless, 
were real.   
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1.   Introduction 
The collapse of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia brought an 
unprecedented increase in economic freedom for hundreds of millions of people. Many 
people, however, still believe that their lives have become worse since the start of the 
transition period. One of the apparent reasons for this belief is a perceived increase in income 
inequality, a perception that is supported by income surveys. However, an analysis of these 
survey results shows that the argument that democratization led to a real increase in income 
inequality is rather weak and that the pre-transition survey data are poor and are biased in an 
unknown direction (Henderson, McNab, and Rózsás 2003). 
Unfortunately, reconstructing pre-transition data with greater accuracy is not 
possible. But because the nostalgia for the communist past is one of the major obstacles to 
further political and economic liberalization, it is important to understand as clearly as 
possible how equal or unequal the socialist economies were.  Therefore, even though no one 
can reconstruct pre-transition data, we can do a much more thorough analysis of the hidden 
inequality of socialism than has been done heretofore.  This analysis is important because it 
will help to determine whether the apparent increase in income inequality after socialism was 
just the revelation of existing inequalities or was real.  In this paper, we examine the hidden 
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period and find much more inequality than shows up in the official statistics.   
This paper is structured as follows. In the first part, we illuminate why economic 
inequality was important for the operation of the centrally-planned economies and how its 
real political purpose distorted its measurement and interpretation. In the second part, we 
identify several sources of inequality in the pre-transition period, the effects of which were 
often overlooked or underestimated by the researchers. The last section concludes and 
suggests courses for future research. 
2.  The Hidden Inequality in Socialism 
In this paper, we use an unorthodox approach to the pre-transition period, an 
approach required by the state of the data.  Instead of trying to reconstruct inequality data 
from low-quality surveys, estimates, and assumptions, we show how the socialist system 
could generate, tolerate and hide inequalities of the order of magnitude measured in Ukraine, 
Russia, and the Kyrgyz Republic today. While many of these factors have been known to the 
research community, their cumulative effect has rarely been considered and, as a result, has 
been underestimated.   
2.1.  Market Forces and Socialism 
The widely recognized inefficiency of the centrally-planned economy was a 
fundamental reason for the high hidden inequality in socialism. The desires of one group or 
individual could be fulfilled only at the expense of others, which means that for central 
planning to work, central planners had to rank order the various wants of various people, and 
compare the importance of, say, one person’s desire for health care with another person’s 
desire for housing. In a centrally-planned economy, planning did not attempt to ensure 
production occurred so that prices and quantities approximated what would have been the 
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did not even attempt to find or estimate these equilibrium values. Their stated goal was to 
provide basic goods in “sufficient” quantities at a low price by directing production resources 
from luxury goods to the production of these basic goods. Pricing was based on a kind of 
cost-based calculation in which unprocessed raw materials were assigned almost no value. 
Since profit was regarded as a sin, and the distinction between the cost of capital and real 
profit was not understood or ignored, the cost of capital was not included in the calculations. 
Price control measures and dictated production quantities were the means to achieve this 
goal. 
Central planning over time distorted the behavior of producers and consumers alike 
while completely destroying the feedback mechanisms of the market. As a result, socialist 
economies displayed many failures besides the classic inefficiencies caused by price control. 
Price control was among the first implemented measures in all of the socialist 
countries after the communist takeover. Shortages appeared quickly, as prices no longer 
reflected the true cost of production. Government requisition of agricultural products was 
common practice in socialist countries. The outright seizure of agricultural products in 
Eastern Europe culminated with the collectivization of farms by the 1960s (Courtois et al. 
n.d.). 
Central planning has two solutions for shortages: rationing and dictated production 
quantities. Both were used widely in socialist economies. Rationing, however, was a short-
term solution because it made the contradictions of the system visible. Therefore central 
planners tried to avoid rationing by finding other solutions to shortages, at least in the case of 
basic commodities. Because dictated production quantities seemed to solve shortage 
problems, they became prevalent in socialist countries. A real market, however, did not exist, 
making it hard to determine whether the actual regulated quantities were below or above the 
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the quantity voluntarily supplied by the producers, because if the producers had been willing 
to produce the required quantity, there would have been no need for dictated quantities. 
Regardless of this, people still had to wait in lines and to pay bribes to shopkeepers to obtain 
products that were commonplace in the marked-based economies of the West. Therefore, the 
dictated quantity must have been lower than the quantity demanded at the regulated price. 
But for certain basic commodities, the case was different. Each country had its own 
set of basic goods that appeared to reflect some normative judgment of what were the 
“needs” of the people. For these products, dictated quantities were well above the demanded 
quantity even at the regulated price. Examples include white bread and milk in plastic bags in 
Hungary
i, and cornmeal and bottled milk in Romania
ii.  These measures resulted in some 
strange situations. For example, because of the overproduction of bread, animals were fed on 
bread not only on household plots
iii, but often even in cooperatives getting their “supply” of 
unsold bread directly from the shops
iv. In Hungary, milk was packed in plastic bags and thus 
could not be sold the next day, and so had to be destroyed. These goods, however, were only 
a few selected favorites of the regime, considered to be essential, not by the people, but by 
the government. 
At the same time many other products, considered to be basic in more developed 
countries, were not available even for a higher price. To estimate the supply and demand for 
bananas or oranges, for example, would be difficult. Oranges were sold only at Christmas 
and at Easter in many of these countries; bananas appeared at Christmas only.
v Even in these 
limited periods, the prices of these fruits were regulated and the resulting small amount 
supplied allowed the average citizen to buy no more than a few pounds. In contrast, some 
people bought a large number of bananas, such as the man in a Hungarian village who stated 
that he had made brandy from bananas.
vi In addition, Hungarian military officers 
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stories about very cheap watermelons being available in huge quantities in the Caucasian 
region.
vii This watermelon production was dictated to supply the whole country, but, because 
the planners did not allocate enough trucks and gasoline to deliver the watermelons to the 
North, the watermelons were overabundant in a small area in the South. 
Smith (1976) tells similar stories.  He writes: 
In spite of the various tinkering reforms, the Soviet economy still 
operates by Plan from above rather than in response to consumer demand 
from below and this produces a lopsided assortment of goods.  Goods are 
produced to fill the Plan, not to sell.  Sometimes the anomalies are baffling.  
Leningrad can be overstocked with cross-country skis and yet go several 
months without soap for washing dishes.  In the Armenian capital of Yerevan, 
I found an ample supply of accordions but local people complained that they 
had gone for weeks without ordinary kitchen spoons or tea samovars.  I knew 
a Moscow family that spent a frantic month hunting for a child’s potty while 
radios were a glut on the market.  In Rostov, on a sweltering mid-90s day in 
June, ice-cream stands were all closed by 2 P.M. and a tourist guide told me 
that it was because the whole area had run out of ice cream, a daily 
occurrence. (Smith, 1976, 78) 
 
Still, basic commodities were not the most inefficient segments of the socialist 
economy. The “heroes” of socialist economies were the military and the heavy industry 
sectors. The central planners' goal in these cases was to produce more in these industries no 
matter how much it cost the country. Initially the planners used the heavy casualties of World 
War II to justify forced development of heavy industry.  But even as the prospect of conflict 
diminished over time, these industries continued to absorb significant quantities of resources. 
No one wanted these products at the price the state paid for them, but the members of top 
nomenklatura received them free of charge. These goods included huge Soviet cars that 
guzzled large amounts of gasoline, unbreakable “military” wristwatches, and hand-crafted 
luxury ornaments. Nevertheless, the most important products in the “heroes” of socialism 
category were products of the defense industry and the “services” of secret police 
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maybe other socialist countries, the defense rationale for producing them was bogus.  The 
real reason for production of these defense goods and secret police "services" was that the 
communist elite needed these goods and services to stay in power. These industries were able 
to expand their control over a major part of resources, therefore becoming politically 
influential, especially in the former Soviet Union. By continuing to draw resources away 
from other uses, this military-industrial complex slowed development and democratization of 
the former Soviet republics during the transition. 
 
2.2.  The Need for Economic Indices 
According to the logic of central planning, measuring production in money terms 
would be “unsocialist” when the government set both prices and quantities. As a consequence 
of this logic, socialist statistical agencies did not use the United Nations (UN) System of 
National Accounts (SNA) during most of the socialist regime. They instead used the material 
product system that was based on production quantities instead of values expressed in money 
terms (Estrin, Urga, and Lazarova 2001; Campos 2001). Interestingly, though, these countries 
started to use the UN SNA before the transition.  Why they did so is an important question. 
Signals of an impending economic crisis were already visible during the 1960s. At 
the macroeconomic level, the Soviet economy was beginning its slow decent into stagnation. 
Thomas Hammond, a researcher who visited Moscow in 1966, described the following: 
An exhibition boasting of Russia’s agricultural achievements seemed 
a bit ironic, because the food situation that year was the worst the country had 
seen in a long time. Indeed, the crop failure was so serious that Russia was 
forced to buy wheat from the United States. (Hammond 1966, 319) 
 
At the microeconomic level, rationing and shortages continued long after World War 
II. A basic rule of thumb was: “If you see something for sale that you want, buy it, because 
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conversation with a Russian professor mentioning food riots in Novocherkassk in 1962.  
Signals of a serious economic crisis were also visible during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Indeed, in the 1970s, shortages were so widespread under socialism that New York Times 
correspondent Hedrick Smith, who won the Pulitzer Prize for his coverage from Moscow, 
titled one chapter of his classic book, The Russians (1976), “Consumers: The Art of 
Queuing.”  In the midst of various stories about queuing for basic consumer items, Smith 
writes, “The accepted norm is that the Soviet woman daily spends two hours in line, seven 
days a week . . .” (Smith 1976, 83).   
 Technological development was slow under socialism and the increasingly quick 
technological change in the West in the 1970s and 1980s meant that the socialist economies 
fell further and further behind.  General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev recognized this.  “Over 
the last few years,” he stated at a conference in November 1989, “the gap between the USSR 
and the developed countries in the assimilation of new, high, and in the first place 
information technologies, based upon the broad use of the latest achievements in science, has 
steadily increased.”
viii Many socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union and Romania, 
experienced serious shortages in almost everything during the 1980s. 
These problems, however, could not be reflected in socialist statistics. The statistics 
instead registered steadily increasing production quantities, and recording fulfillments and 
over-fulfillments of plans was the ideal method to show development where there was no 
development at all. Using this method to cover the problems in statistics, however, did not 
solve the underlying problems. Inefficiencies of socialist economies caused the planners to 
look for resources elsewhere. “Exporting revolution” did not help because central planning 
destroyed the economy in all of the countries newly subscribing to the collectivist ideology. 
The only way to sustain the regime for additional decades was to borrow from Western 
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economic indices in the form accepted by the rest of the world, socialist countries first used 
the material product system and the System of National Accounts parallel to each other, and 
finally abandoned the material product system before the political changes. 
 
2.3.  Statistics in Socialism 
Switching to a new system of aggregating numbers from the same sources caused 
little change to the deceiving nature of socialist statistics. Filer and Hanousek (2002, 234) 
caution about the consequences of the differences between Western and socialist accounting 
standards and the danger of seemingly identical meanings of totally different variables. 
Campos argues that socialist statistical offices, originally set up for measuring quantities, 
“were poorly equipped to deal with issues such as price changes and unemployment.” 
(Campos 2001, 667) Campos also observes that fulfilling plan targets, the main incentive of 
socialist statisticians, led to overreporting the results. 
In fact, the newly implemented economic indices had no real meaning in centrally-
planned economies anyway. The reason is that in a situation where all prices and production 
quantities are regulated, calculating GDP values from five-year plans would have been just as 
good, and just as meaningless, as measuring them using sophisticated statistical methods. 
Once the key numbers for the next period were established by the planners, it was easier to 
derive false data to support these numbers than to accurately measure productivity and 
output, measurements which would have showed the fallacy of the planning process. Since 
statistical offices did not have the power to question the sensibility of the plans, providing the 
“right” input for calculating aggregated indices was safer than providing the real one. 
In summary, pre-transition statistical data cannot be used to describe the real 
economic and social conditions of the socialist era. Therefore, researchers must turn to other 
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sources existed for these countries, because they were different from many developing 
countries having insufficient statistical capabilities. While in the case of many developing 
countries, a weak but willing state often welcomed independent researchers from developed 
countries, in socialist countries the state was strong enough to prevent most, if not all, 
independent research. 
For the reasons above, the reported experience of various individuals and 
generalizations from typical examples are the only possible ways of reaching the truth. In the 
next section, we rely mainly on these tools to describe the sources and real levels of 
inequality in the socialist era. 
2.4.  Examples of Hidden Inequalities and Income Transfers in Socialism 
When price regulation causes shortages, people make up the difference between the 
low regulated price and the equilibrium price by standing in lines, paying bribes to 
shopkeepers, or using other practices. In every political system, the politically powerful have 
an advantage.  Under the comprehensive price controls of World War II in United  States, for 
example, gasoline was rationed and Congressmen and high government officials were given 
"A" ration stickers that allowed them all the gasoline they wanted at an artificially low price; 
the average citizen was often unable to drive from one city to another, given the small 
amount of gasoline allowed him.  Airplane and railway tickets were also rationed.  The 
famous television newsman, David Brinkley, for example, tells how, as a young man during 
the war, he broke up a romance because he was unable to travel to the city where his lady 
friend lived.  Brinkley writes, “The new gasoline ration was too small to allow me to drive.  
Airplane and railroad tickets required a priority.”  (Brinkley 1995, 46) 
Under socialism, where there was a one-party state, the rationing system was 
one of even more extreme privilege.  Because no legal political forces existed outside 
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Although all of these countries had a certain kind of legislative body, it was 
subordinated to the communist party through the party membership of the 
legislatures. As a result, real decisions were made by party leaders, who took no 
direct responsibility for these decisions. This system led to a plethora of privileges for 
top state officials and party members at all levels with privileged access to goods and 
services among them. Moreover, privileges often meant not only privileged access, 
but also different prices. 
Since members of the nomenklatura had power over the disposition of various scarce 
resources, they frequently used their connections to receive and provide favors to each other 
at the expense of the rest of society. In addition, this group was not only able to use these 
resources but also to overuse them or give them away, due to the lack of oversight and the 
concentration of power in the elite of the communist party. The only price they had to pay for 
these privileges was their loyalty to the regime, which was more important to the regime than 
actual party membership. 
2.4.1.  The Real Value of Privileges 
While the extended system of privileges obviously had an impact on income 
inequalities in the socialist era, this impact did not appear in pre-transition income inequality 
measures.  As one discontented Soviet put it, “Everything is markirovannoye—masked.”
ix 
Leonid Brezhnev, for example, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party and 
President of the USSR, had a Rolls Royce, Mercedes, Cadillac, Lincoln Continental, Monte 
Carlo, Matra, and Lancia Beta.
x  Of course, these items never showed up in Brezhnev’s 
reported income.  Referring to the effect of subsidies on essential items and the quality of 
vacation homes for the top party brass, one author, Milanovic (1996) argues that these 
  10privileges would not have altered income inequality measures to a great extent, saying that 
the value of these privileges was exaggerated by others: 
Elite privileges were exaggerated both by indigenous population, 
because of the secrecy in which privileges were held, and by overly credulous 
Western analysts. In effect anybody who has visited vacation homes 
previously kept strictly off-limits for all but the top Party brass can testify, 
their level of comfort and service is below that of an average Holiday Inn. 
(Milanovic 1996, 200) 
 
The problem here is that, in dismissing the value of a vacation home by comparing it 
unfavorably to a Holiday Inn, Milanovic is, wittingly or not, implicitly appealing to Western 
standards.  Few middle-class readers in the United States will regard a Holiday Inn as a 
luxury hotel.  To almost any one in the eastern European socialist countries, however, a 
Holiday Inn would have been the height of luxury.  So, if we want to "translate" Milanovic's 
statement for Western ears, it would go something like this: 
 In effect anybody who has visited vacation homes previously kept strictly 
off-limits for all but the top Party brass can testify, their level of comfort and 
service is below that of an average Hyatt.  
 
In other words, access to a vacation home that was rather high-quality by socialist 
standards, for a couple of weeks each year free of charge, was a substantial perquisite 
for those with political connections, one that would have been widely envied by those 
without. 
The nomenklatura had access, not only to goods, but also to state resources.  
This was clearly true for those at the top: 
During the past decade tens of thousands of workers slaved to satisfy 
Ceauşescu and his wife, Elena, by creating gold-leaf walls, crystal 
chandeliers, marble columns, intricate parquets, handwoven carpets. Their 
reward: breadlines and winters without heat. With more than a thousand 
rooms the palace is one of the largest buildings in the world. (Szulc 1991, 5) 
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treatment in health care, education, and housing, exceptions to rules about traveling abroad, 
customs, and the possession of foreign currency.  Take just one of these special treatments, 
the ability to travel abroad.  One way for Westerners to understand the importance of this one 
difference is for us to imagine that our Western government has a generally-enforced 
stricture on travel abroad, but that it relaxes this stricture for the small percent of the 
population that is politically connected.  So, for example, if we live in New York, we are 
prohibited from traveling to Montreal, Toronto, London, Paris, Tokyo, or any other place 
outside of the United States.  Most of us would regard this one stricture as a huge drop in our 
real income and would, therefore, regard permission to travel to these newly-exotic cities as a 
substantial benefit. 
Not just the exceptions to the rules on travel abroad, but also all of the other rules—
on health care, housing, and education—exacerbated income inequality. These differences 
were less visible for the general public and also more difficult to understand while they were 
far more important in preparing for the political changes and privatization. We discuss some 
of these differences in this section. 
2.2.2. Corruption 
An unmeasured but pervasive practice, corruption, may have also significantly 
influenced income inequality in the pre-transition period. Corruption, as measured through 
surveys and other subjective practices, appeared to rise early in the transition process, 
especially with respect to the privatization process (Goorha 2000, World Bank 2000). 
Corruption, through its negative influence on economic growth, tax progressivity, and asset 
ownership, has been, in general, found to influence income inequality. Thus, some 
researchers have concluded that income inequality must have increased in the transition 
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concentration of former state-owned assets in the hands of the few (Gupta, Davoodi, and 
Alonso-Terme 1998). 
However, even though corruption during the transition to private ownership must 
surely have increased personal wealth for those who were corrupt, the increase in measured 
inequality cannot be due to this corruption because the increases in personal wealth were not 
counted as income in the surveys in transition countries. On the other hand, corruption in 
public administration, health care, education, or law enforcement directly affected income 
inequality in both the pre-transition and transition period.  The most important thing to note 
here is that this kind of corruption was much more prevalent in the socialist era. Measuring 
this corruption, however is much more difficult than measuring corruption in privatization, or 
in business practices in the transition period. 
Interestingly, both Goorha and the World Bank study cited above identify the origins 
of today’s corruption in pre-transition practices. These sources cite, as the cradle of today’s 
practices, the formation of the nomenklatura through the influence of communist parties that 
appointed individuals to key positions. Among the origins of corruption, the World Bank 
study also mentions the culture of state intervention together with the rapid devaluation of the 
salaries of bureaucrats during the early years of transition. Despite this, neither study 
considered whether corruption might have been higher in the era when the legislature and the 
judicial branch were inseparable from the executive branch of the government, with the 
Communist party controlling all of them as well as the researchers’ access to data on these 
countries.  Yet basic economic theory, in this case, the idea that when people can more easily 
get away with something that benefits them personally, they will do so, implies that 
corruption must have been greater under Communism.  Corruption in privatization was only 
one aspect of corruption, which was relatively easy to measure in a new era when conducting 
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might have caused researchers to assume that there had been little corruption in the past. In 
fact, there was no connection between corruption and privatization in the socialist era for one 
main reason: the socialist era, by definition, had no privatization. 
But we need not rely on basic economic theory; we can also look at the evidence.  
Shortages and artificially-low official prices, the existence of privileges and black markets, 
and the uncontrolled power of bureaucrats all helped corruption to thrive in an era of lies and 
nationalized plunder. People without connections had to pay unofficial service fees for 
practically everything. Those who paid the fees were, typically, already in the lower part of 
the income scale. Those who received the fees, on the other hand, were, typically, already in 
the upper part of the income scale.  Therefore because such fees were unmeasured, the degree 
of income inequality was understated. This system of bribery became so prevalent during the 
socialist era that few people in the socialist countries considered it as corruption.  These 
conditioned reflexes, not political liberalization and termination of direct state control, are the 
main driving forces behind corruption in the transitional economies today. 
2.2.3. Health  Care 
Informal payments in the health care sector also received attention in the transition 
period as serious impediments to health care reform (Lewis 2000). The research shows that in 
the former Soviet republics, informal payments were made in over 60 percent of transactions; 
the frequency of informal payments was 91 percent in Armenia. Informal payments are also 
reported in most Eastern European countries. 
While these payments were undoubtedly frequent during the transition, what is left 
out is what happened before the transition: in socialist countries, the majority of people 
regularly paid for health care. Referring to such payments as gratituities rather than bribes 
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low-quality and often dangerous.  Smith, for example, tells of a conversation he had with an 
East German gynecologist who had practiced for three years in Leningrad.  She stated: 
Hospitals are overcrowded.  Now they are building them with smaller rooms, 
say six to a room, but the ones I saw had many beds.  Not a very pleasant 
atmosphere.  The food is poor.  Most families bring food to their relatives in 
hospitals and they give gifts to the saniturki, nurses’ aides, so that bed linens 
will be changed regularly and things will be kept cleaner. (Smith 1976, 96) 
 
     On the other hand, no payment was required from the well connected, who were 
already in the higher income portion, because they could do favors for the doctors and nurses 
at the expense of the state. In addition, well-connected people did not wait in lines while the 
average citizen could not even make an advance appointment. Special hospitals for the 
privileged had better equipment, more trained personnel and better collateral services. In the 
Soviet Union, for example, the nomenklatura could get zero-price care at the Kremlin Clinic, 
which was not one clinic but a system of clinics and hospitals.  Other nomenklatura could go 
to sanitariums and clinics along the Baltic Coast and the Black Sea, run by the “Fourth 
Administration” of the Ministry of Health.  Other prestigious organizations like the Academy 
of Sciences and the Bolshoi Ballet and Opera Company had special clinics and hospitals that 
were much higher-quality than the average.
xi Because these institutions were also part of the 
state provided “free” health care system, the fee was either very low or zero.  And the most 
powerful political leaders often had the doctors come to them.  
Another form of discrimination was to prescribe different medicines for privileged 
and non-privileged people with the same health problems. In more difficult cases, differences 
in methods and available equipment were also evident. While for the privileged elite even an 
expensive operation in a Western hospital would have been available at government expense, 
the citizen without connections would be subject to inferior treatment and conditions. 
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official data imply. 
2.2.4. Education 
Pre-transition inequality in education is another important factor overlooked or 
underestimated by most researchers. Mickelwright observed, for the transition, an increase in 
the ratio of household education expenditures per child in the top decile to expenditures per 
child in the bottom decile of per capita income in Slovakia and Bulgaria (Mickelwright 1999, 
365, Figure 7). Based mainly on this observation, he argued that access to education became 
more restricted for low-income families during the transition. But this conclusion doesn't 
follow from his data. The increasing difference in education expenditures is consistent with a 
much more plausible explanation, given how socialism operated.  That simpler explanation is 
that the elite presently spend more on education to obtain a higher quality education for their 
children, whereas, under socialism, the elite could get a better education for their children 
without spending more because the government provided better schools for the children of 
the elite.   
A recent study of the World Bank on the challenges faced by transition countries in 
the field of education (World Bank 2000.) also focuses on problems that arose during the 
transition, depicting education in the communist era as ideal. The study reports enrollment 
rates in tertiary education
xii for the transition period from 1989 to 1997. The reported 
enrollment rates are displayed in Figure 2.2. 
{Figure 2.2 goes here] 
As shown in the figure, enrollment rates in tertiary education have increased in most 
transition countries, even in some of the otherwise weakly performing former Soviet 
republics. Far from showing increasing inequality, this increase shows the opposite.  The 
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communist past, when all efforts were concentrated on building a static society with 
emphasis on basic education and barriers to higher education. Important to notice is that the 
communist motive for emphasizing basic education was not philanthropic. The main 
purposes were to build loyalty to the regime and to maintain the hierarchy of society. The 
main problem of central planners in this field was a direct consequence of assuming the role 
of organizing the economy. With total control of the economy, communist leaders had to 
realize that they became responsible for assigning people even to the most menial jobs. As 
one Hungarian government official asked, “who will get the hoe if everybody studies?” 
Although most of the early leaders of the socialist countries were not highly educated, this 
ruling elite soon realized that privileged access to education was an important factor in 
maintaining their power. The barriers built into the educational system served this purpose 
effectively. 
On the other hand, education had to be "free" for the sake of socialist rhetoric. As a 
result, "free" higher education, available for everybody in theory, benefited the elite even 
more than a higher education with high tuition fees. Communist decorations, party 
membership of the parents, and references from the secretary of the local section of 
communist youth organizations all played a part in the entry process into higher education.  
This facilitated selection in favor of the already-privileged, already-higher-income groups. 
Interestingly, despite his claim that, during the transition, access to education became more 
restricted for lower-income people, even Mickelwright noted that these biased selection 
methods under communism created privileges for the elite: 
 
Studies and data emerging in the 1990s, however, have confirmed that 
as in some other aspects of life in the socialist system there were considerable 
disparities in educational opportunities and achievements. Access to upper 
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associated with social class background that are found in Western countries. 
… In both countries [Hungary and Poland], the children of the highest social 
class were almost four times as likely as the average person to obtain an 
academic upper secondary or tertiary qualification, while children from other 
non-manual backgrounds were about twice as likely to do so. This fits 
strikingly with the pattern shown for Western European countries. 
(Mickelwright 1999, 351) 
 
Two important distinctions must be made, though, between the West and the socialist 
countries.  First, in Western countries, parents or students had to pay more for better 
education, unlike the situation in the socialist countries.  Second, those in the West who have 
higher incomes are typically more productive than those with lower incomes; in the East, by 
contrast, those with higher incomes were typically well-connected politically.   
2.2.5. Housing  Programs 
Subsidized housing was another forgotten source of inequality in socialist countries. 
Parallel to the forced industrialization in the late 1950s and the 1960s, socialist countries 
started massive residential construction programs in the cities. The main purpose of these 
housing programs was to provide subsidized housing for the working class, at the expense of 
the rural population and the homeowners in the cities. The new housing units were usually 
owned by the state and administered by the city councils. While the allocation of these units 
was characterized by the usual corrupt practices of the socialist regime, the rents were very 
low. People in villages, by contrast, did not receive subsidized housing programs; instead, 
they experienced forced collectivizing of privately-owned farms and nationalizing of 
livestock and farming equipment. By the 1970s, construction programs had slowed, but 
housing in the cities was still heavily subsidized by the state, with rents well below the cost 
of maintenance. In Romania, state residential construction reached the villages also in the 
1980s. In most cases, however, Romania’s housing programs for the rural population were 
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houses. As a result, many villagers were forced to live in four or five-story concrete panel 
buildings without central heating, carrying firewood by foot to their apartment every day. 
Despite these programs, the share of the population living in state-owned apartments was 
only around 20 % in most Eastern European countries, with a substantially higher rate in the 
former Soviet republics (Diamond 1999). 
According to the data, private rental was either extremely rare or non-existent. In 
contrast, shortages in state-provided housing led many people to rent rooms or apartments 
from individuals. This practice, however, was illegal or quasi-illegal in the socialist era. On 
the other hand, private rentals from individuals had a significant impact on income 
inequalities in both the pre-transition and the transition period. In the pre-transition period, 
income from subletting rooms or apartments was an invisible income transfer, often from 
commuters living in villages to the already subsidized part of the urban population. This 
transfer caused income inequality to be higher than reported. For the transition period, 
income from sublets has been heavily underreported in income surveys, since this income is 
easy to hide from the tax authorities. In the transition period, however, this income transfer 
may cause a decrease in income inequality, because in many cases the landlords are low-
income individuals living in former industrial cities that suffered most from recession.   
Reporting the income, therefore, would cause a measured decrease in income inequality.  The 
net result, therefore, is that both the underreporting of rental income in the Communist era 
and the underreporting of rental income during the transition cause the increase in inequality 
to be overstated.   
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The level of housing subsidies was not the only difference between cities and villages 
under the socialist regime. Virtually all urban development under socialism was at the 
expense of the rural population. While income from farm self-employment is usually counted 
in income surveys, the value of subsidies not directly allocated to individuals is not counted. 
On the other hand, most of the schools at the level of secondary education or above were in 
cities, even if they trained workers for agriculture. Health care institutions and public 
administration were also concentrated in the cities. These were, however, not the most 
serious factors shaping the differences between the rural and urban population. 
While concentrating on forced industrialization, central planners overlooked a less 
interesting, but more important sector of the economy: agriculture. As a consequence of this 
failure, socialist countries experienced serious food shortages during the 1950s. Since land 
was still privately owned, communists concluded that private ownership was the reason for 
food shortages. As early as 1929, Stalin announced that the Soviets would turn to the 
annihilation of the kulaks as a class instead of limiting their exploiting ambitions (Courtois et 
al. n.d.). Their solution was to fulfill the needs of the cities by requisitions in the villages. In 
many cases, they took even the seed and workstock needed for the next production year. 
When the communists realized that requisitions did not solve the problem, they turned to 
forced collectivization, practically turning landowners into slaves of the state. Neither the 
impact of these measures on inequality, nor the cost of replacing this capital, which was often 
paid by the former farmers in the form of money and of overtime work, was counted in 
income surveys of socialist statistics.  Thus, again, income inequality was understated.  A 
good illustration of this gap between the city and the village can be found in Berend’s 
description of the reforms in Hungary during the early 1980s, when the communist 
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companies.  In describing the 1980s reforms, Berend refers to the earlier situation in 
agriculture: 
 
In the state-owned large industrial enterprises, worker-engineer 
cooperatives were established. Members sign contracts with their own 
companies, whose machinery and tools they use. They do overtime on their 
own for considerably higher pay, increasing labor input significantly. The 
result is that while legal working hours had been curtailed to 40 hours per 
week, the activities of these cooperatives and individuals increased the total 
working hours on a voluntary basis. Previously this phenomenon was 
observable only in agriculture, where half the number of those employed in 
industry contributed the same number of working hours as the industrial 
work force. [emphasis added] (Berend 1990, 400-401) 
 
  In other words, according to Berend, people working in agriculture were 
working twice as many hours as people outside agriculture.  Thus what might have 
looked like a small difference between country and city in the statistics really showed 
that real income per hour was much lower in the country. 
2.2.7. Savings 
Lost savings have probably been the most common reason for nostalgia during the 
transition. Savings provided a perception of security, and savings in socialist countries were 
“among the highest in the world, averaging about 30 percent” (Denizer and Wolf 2000, 446). 
During the first few years of transition, however, saving rates dropped dramatically in the 
transition countries. Remarkably, these changes followed the same pattern as many other 
variables like inequality, economic growth, or per capita GDP. In the pre-transition period, 
socialist countries looked like a homogenous group with economic indices corresponding to 
the socialist ideology. Shortly after the political changes, however, this uniformity ceased to 
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than in the pre-transition era. 
This coincidence supports the argument of Denizer and Wolf (2000) that the reason 
for the rapid decrease in the saving rates was involuntary saving in the pre-transition period. 
Because access to goods and services depended on privileges and connections in the 
centrally-planned economy, those not privileged or connected could not spend on goods they 
wanted. As a result, these citizens were able to save.  Savings under socialism, therefore, 
were a passive result of a generalized shortage of goods. 
During the transition to a market-oriented economy, spending on goods previously 
unavailable became possible. At the same time, however, high inflation devalued these 
savings, giving the impression of growing poverty. However, because savings in the socialist 
era could not be spent, their real value was well below the perceived value. In other words, 
the part of income saved during the socialist era was less valuable for people without 
privileged access to certain goods, causing income inequality in the pre-transition era to be 
underreported. 
2.2.8.  Privatization and the Last Decade of Socialism 
It was not an accident that socialist countries started to experiment with reforms from 
the mid 1970s on. While the increase in world oil prices seems to be an obvious explanation, 
it was not the real reason. In fact, the escalation of oil prices in 1974 even helped the Soviet 
Union because of its huge oil reserves. The real reason was different. World War II caused 
serious losses for the Soviet Union and also for the new socialist countries of Eastern Europe. 
When the Soviet Union tried to cover its losses by forcing some of the Eastern European 
countries to pay compensation, these countries' governments decided to nationalize industries 
to generate revenue. Nationalization partly provided the funds for war compensation to be 
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hand, nationalization did not create wealth or raise the capital assets of these countries. As a 
result, socialist countries experienced their first economic crises as early as the late 1950s. 
Since central planning did not create the incentives necessary for economic development, 
socialist leaders turned to the “proven” method of taking property by force again. This time 
they quasi-nationalized the agriculture sector by forced collectivization during the 1960s. By 
collectivizing, however, they exhausted their last reserves. There was nothing to take and 
nobody to take from any more.  You can't nationalize the same asset twice. 
At this point, central planners had two choices. They could either satisfy their needs 
by further expansion to countries outside the socialist block, or incentivise people by letting 
them own private property beyond immediate consumption purposes. The first option was 
not sustainable because wherever socialist economic principles were introduced, they 
destroyed the economy of the given country. As a result, economic liberalization remained 
the only option. On the other hand, communist leaders and beneficiaries of the socialist 
regime did not always recognize these problems. Reforms in Czechoslovakia, for example, 
led to a Soviet-led intervention by Warsaw Pact countries in 1968. Another example is the 
case of Hungary, where the reforms of 1968 caused internal social conflicts as well as a rapid 
rise in acknowledged inequalities. As Berend stated, “before 1968 the ratio between the 
lowest and highest salaries was 3:1; it quickly changed after that year to 9:1.” (Berend 1990, 
397) 
Major changes, however, could not be postponed for long. Starting in the early 1980s, 
socialist countries followed similar paths of reforms directed by the communist governments. 
The first step was the creation of small, semi-independent production units within state 
enterprises (as described by Berend (1990) in the case of Hungary.) These units were 
composed of employees who performed certain tasks as regular employees and others on a 
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serious disadvantages. The main problem was that, when working in these production units, 
employees used the same equipment provided by the same company for their regular jobs. 
They were also better paid for contracted tasks. As a result, these employees became almost 
counterproductive in their regular jobs in order to guarantee that they could perform the same 
tasks as contracted work later. 
Parallel to the introduction of these production units, socialist governments allowed 
some primitive forms of small private enterprises. Connections or bribes, however, were 
essential when applying for a license. As a result, communists often became the first 
“successful entrepreneurs” in an environment without competitors, as in the case described 
below: 
In the wine country south of Budapest, I meet Gábor Kemény in the 
little town of Izsák. Kemény, a former Communist Party member, is Izsák’s 
most successful entrepreneur. He owns a pleasant restaurant named Fekete 
Bárány (Black Sheep), the general store, and the local gas station. He makes 
wine and champagne on land leased from the local cooperative. (Szulc 1991, 
25) 
 
Another component of preparing for the transition period was the increase of 
consumer prices, resulting in high inflation in the last decade of the pre-transition period and 
the erosion of the real value of savings for those unable to spend their money on goods and 
services due to shortages. Some of these savings were also spent on shopping trips in 
Western Europe, mainly Austria, Germany and Italy, during the last few years of the socialist 
regime and the early years of transition. The intensity of this shopping tourism also indicates 
that the lack of access to desired consumer goods, not socialist frugality, was the reason 
behind savings in the pre-transition era. 
Parallel to the process of the devaluing savings, communist leaders of the former 
socialist countries prepared for privatization. Enterprise reforms starting in the 1980s, and in 
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(Nellis 2002, 3). The stated goal was to create incentives through more autonomy. On the 
other hand, these measures had a serious side effect observed by Estrin (2002), a side effect 
that was probably intentional. 
Under communism, the monitoring of management and the incentives 
for efficiency were already weak. But with the collapse of central planning 
and the lack of any other external constraints, managers and insiders in 
transition economies gained almost total discretion to follow their own 
objectives, leading to “asset stripping” by managers, job and wage guarantees 
for workers and rent absorption by all parties. This pattern was exacerbated in 
countries with well-entrenched black economy and sometimes led to a virtual 
“capture” of the state-owned apparatus, including the natural resource and 
utility sectors, by unscrupulous managers. (Estrin 2002, 107) 
 
The word “rent” in the above quote is used in the economic sense—a payment over 
and above the amount necessary to keep the resource in its current use.  Given that the elite 
was well-positioned and that the public wanted changes, the first wave of privatization passed 
over quickly. Fearing that the reform process would reverse, most researchers and external 
advisors also preferred rapid massive privatization to a slow, but, possibly, more-considered 
process, advocated by Kornai (1990). This speed, however, had a price. In Russia, for 
example, “The need to reward the key stakeholders had led to firm managers and workers, 
‘insiders’ as they became known, ending up with a dominant 2/3 of the shares in about 2/3 of 
all firms divested.” (Nellis 2002, 50) 
Another important aspect of privatization was the exclusion of foreign purchasers. 
With the exceptions only of Hungary and Estonia, where foreign capital purchased about 20 
and 50 percent of the privatized assets respectively, foreign investors were unable to 
participate in the privatization (Estrin 2002). While local media mainly attributed this 
exclusion to a public aversion to foreign ownership, it was probably due more to aversion by 
the elite. Their interest was in convincing the public about the advantages of excluding 
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allowing them to pay lower prices for their asset purchases. Another advantage of excluding 
foreign investors was that doing so made it easier to hide valuable information from the 
public. 
Ingrown reflexes from the socialist era and the willingness of the old-new elite of the 
early transition, who continued the practices of the past in order to take advantage of their 
position in the government, also affected the outcomes of privatization.  Consider this 
example from the former Czechoslovakia: 
At the last moment some cracks had appeared in the Stalinist walls: 
Officials in Prague in May 1990 noted that from late 1988 workers in large 
firms had been allowed to select their managers from a list of three presented 
to them by the branch ministry. They said they had regarded this as a 
revolutionary change at the time. What was striking, however, was that the 
post-communist regime reversed this decision in April of 1990, and reinstated 
managerial appointment solely by the branch ministries. Why? Because ‘the 
professors and researchers’ who made up the new administration accepted – 
unlike the Poles, with their longer history of struggle and suspicion, and the 
availability of alternatives – that it was the state that had to define and 
allocate property rights [emphasis added]. (Nellis 2002, 24) 
 
In his 2002 article, Roland argues that while privatization policy favoring insiders 
could result in a high concentration of wealth and power, these policies themselves may not 
be the ultimate reasons for such concentration. These privatization policies themselves could 
be the results of prior privilege-seeking activities during the pre-transition period. The above 
quote also supports this second statement: not the policy choices of the transition period, but 
the efficiency of the elite to position itself was the main determinant of today’s differences in 
the transition countries. In other words, privatization did not increase inequality; it only made 
it visible and measurable. The control over the same wealth had been more concentrated 
before the transition than in the transition period; it only changed its form from political 
control to a control based on ownership. 
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In the past few years, research on transition economies found that income inequality 
increased in spite of a parallel liberalization of political and economic life in the former 
socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Since the observed increase in 
inequality occurring parallel to political liberalization contradicted previous findings in other 
regions (Gradstein and Milanovic 2000), and many authors warned about poor data quality 
(Milanovic 1998, Rosser, Rosser, and Ahmed 2000), overlooked factors (Kattuman and 
Redmond 2001), and the effect of special circumstances (Ferreira  1999), the apparent 
increase of income inequality was suspect and required further analysis. 
Other research into the various factors that affected either the level or the measure of 
income inequality showed that the argument that economic and political liberalization of 
centrally-planned economies led to higher income inequality is rather weak (Henderson, 
McNab, and Rózsás 2003).  This research also showed that an explanation based on a large 
uniform bias in the pre-transition data towards smaller measured inequality is more likely. 
Unfortunately, reconstructing pre-transition data on income inequality with greater accuracy 
and reliability is not possible. 
This paper analyzes the hidden inequality in socialism with a different approach. As 
seen in the first part of the analysis, statistical data from the socialist era did not provide a 
valid base for comparison between the socialist and the transition period. Economic indices 
were meaningless in a centrally-planned economy and the purpose of statistics was to justify 
the existence of the regime – not to reveal its real character. As a result, the methods used by 
the regimes were unreliable and inaccurate, and could hide huge inequalities.   
In addition, the socialist economy and society had built-in mechanisms to hide huge 
income transfers from even the most accurate survey methods. Consequently, the ultimate 
  27source of the inequalities was neither the economic or political liberalization, the 
transformation from a centrally-planned to market oriented economy, nor any other aspect of 
the transition process. Rather, what caused the inequality was uncontrolled political power in 
the socialist era. Being uncontrolled, this power provided the ruling class the opportunity to 
concentrate on the benefits of the economy through legalized pillage of private property, the 
promotion of corruption and the system of privileged access to consumer goods.  
In summary, inequalities in real disposable income were so high in these societies, 
and survey methods were so unreliable that, even if the real inequality measures of the 
socialist era cannot be reconstructed, a real increase in income inequality during the transition 
is not likely. In addition, programs that increased income inequality by helping some of the 
higher-income people looked to the outside world like programs that actually helped the 
poorest. The reason is that most of these countries were much poorer than the official 
communist propaganda reported. Therefore, a program that subsidized, say, petty party 
functionaries and miners, who were poor by Western standards, actually transferred wealth 
from the poorest to the second-highest tier in communist society. 
Beyond being a source of nostalgia for the communist past, income inequality in 
transition countries is important as an indicator of the “state of affairs” in these countries. The 
equality of income and wealth, however, is only one aspect of welfare and not the most 
important. 
In fact, the causes of income inequality are more important than the level of income 
inequality itself.  In a market economy, income inequality can create incentives to work 
harder, study more, and take sensible risks, and thus may contribute to economic growth. On 
the other hand, inequality caused and maintained by plunder discourages people from 
working or studying more and hinders economic development. Therefore, further research 
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corruption and income redistribution through government transfers. 
After decades of socialism, people in the transition countries cannot always 
differentiate between inequalities caused by different factors. For this reason, eliminating 
income inequality that is due to corruption, fraud, abuse of power, and unjustified 
government transfers is even more important in these countries, and the appropriate way to 
do it is to eliminate or reduce corruption, fraud, abuse of power, and unjustified government 
transfers. The economic miseries caused by more than four decades of central government 
planning cannot be cured with other government programs. Instead of nurturing nostalgia, 
governments and legislators of the transition countries should abolish unnecessary 
restrictions on their economies, eliminate subsidies and decrease taxes, and cut back on the 
overgrown and inefficient system of government transfers, including social security. 
Additionally, transition countries should reinforce public administration and jurisdiction 
through extended training of government officials, and determined measures against 
corruption and fraud. 
  29List of References 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 1989. 
Berend, Iván T. 1990. Contemporary Hungary, 1956-1984. A History of Hungary, ed. Péter 
F. Sugár, Péter Hanák, Tibor Frank, 384-400. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press. 
Brinkley, David. 1995. 11 Presidents, 4 Wars, 22 Political Conventions, 1 Moon Landing, 3 
Assassinations, 2,000 Weeks of News and Other Stuff on Television and 18 Years of 
Growing Up in North Carolina. New York: Ballantine Books. 
Campos, Nauro F. 2001. Will the Future Be Better Tomorrow? The Growth Prospects of 
Transition Economies Revisited. Journal of Comparative Economics, 29: 663-676. 
Courtois, Stéphane, Nicolas Werth, Jean-Louis Panné, Karel Bartosek, Jean-Louis Margolin 
and Andrzej Paczkowski. n.d. A kommunizmus fekete könyve. Bűntény, terror, 
megtorlás (The black book of communism. Crime, terror, reprisal). Translated by 
János Benyhe. n.p.: Nagyvilág. 
Denizer, Cevdet and Holger C. Wolf. 2000. The Saving Collapse during the Transition in 
Eastern Europe. The World Bank Economic Review. 14, no. 3: 445-455. 
Diamond, Douglas B. 1999. The Transition in Housing Finance in Central Europe and 
Russia: 1989-1999. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute. 
Estrin, Saul. 2002. Competition and Corporate Governance in Transition. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 16, no. 1: 101-124. 
Estrin, Saul, Giovanni Urga, and Stepana Lazarova. 2001. Testing for Ongoing Convergence 
in Transition Economies, 1970 to 1998. Journal of Comparative Economics, 29: 677-
691. 
Ferreira, Francisco H.G. 1999. Inequality and Economic Performance. A Brief Overview of 
Theories of Growth and Distribution. Washington, DC: World Bank. Web Site on 
Inequality, Poverty, and Socio-economic Performance. Available from 
http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/inequal/index.htm 
Filer, Randall K. and Jan Hanousek. 2002. Data Watch: Research Data from Transition 
Economies. Journal of Economic Perspectives 16, no. 1: 225-240. 
Friedman, Milton. 1994. Introduction to The Road to Serfdom, by Friedrich A. Hayek. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. ix-xx. 
Goldman, Marshall. 1983. U.S.S.R. in Crisis: The Failure of an Economic System. New 
York: W.W. Norton. 
  30Goldman, Marshall. 1987. Gorbachev’s Crisis. New York: W.W. Norton. 
Goorha, Prateek. 2000. Corruption: Theory and Evidence through Economies in Transition. 
International Journal of Social Economics. 27, no. 12: 1180-1204. Available from 
http://www.emerald-library.com 
Gradstein, M. and B. Milanovic. 2000. Does Liberte = Egalite? A Survey of the Empirical 
Evidence on the Links Between Political Democracy and Income Inequality. Working 
Paper. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Gupta, Sanjeev, Hamid Davoodi, and Rosa Alonso-Terme. 1998. Does Corruption Affect 
Inequality and Poverty? IMF Working Paper WP/98/76. Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Found. 
Hammond, Thomas T. 1966. An American in Mocквa Russia’s Capital. National 
Geographic, March. 
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1994. The Road to Serfdom, with an introduction by Milton Friedman. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Henderson, David R., Robert M. McNab, and Tamas Rozsas. 2002. Did Inequality Increase 
in Transition? An Analysis of the Transitional Countries of Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia.. Naval Postgraduate School Working Paper. 
Kattuman, Paul and Gerry Redmond. 2001. Income Inequality in Early Transition: The Case 
of Hungary 1987-1996. Journal of Comparative Economics 29: 40-65. 
Kornai, Janos. 1990. The Road to a Free Economy: Shifting From a Socialist System – the 
Example of Hungary. New York: Norton. 
Lebergott, Stanley. 1993. Pursuing Happiness: American Consumers in the Twentieth 
Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Lewis, Maureen. 2000. Who is Paying for Health Care in Eastern Europe and Central Asia? 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Mickelwright, John. 1999. Education, Inequality and Transition. Economics of Transition 
7:343-376. 
Milanovic, Branko. 1996. Poverty and Inequality in Transition Economies: What Has 
Actually Happened In Economic Transition in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, 
ed. Barlomiej Kaminski, 171-205. International Politics of Eurasia Series, vol. 8. 
Armonk, N.Y. and London: Sharpe. 
Milanovic, Branko. 1998. Income, Inequality, and Poverty during the Transition from 
Planned to Market Economy. Regional and Sectoral Studies. Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank. 
Nellis, John. 2002. Extrenal Advisors and Privatization in Transition Economies. Working 
Paper Number 3. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
  31Roland, Gérard. 2002. The Political Economy of Transition. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 16, no. 1: 29-50. 
Rosser, J. Barkley, Jr., Marina V. Rosser, and Ehsan Ahmed. 2000. Income Inequality and 
the Informal Economy in Transition Economies. Journal of Comparative Economics 
28: 156-171. 
Shane, Scott. 1994. Dismantling Utopia: How Information Ended the Soviet Union. Chicago: 
Ivan R. Dee. 
Smith, Hedrick. 1976. The Russians. New York: Ballantine Books. 
Szulc, Tad. 1991. Dispatches from Eastern Europe. National Geographic, March. 
World Bank. 2000. Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
World Bank. 2000.  Hidden Challenges to Education Systems in Transition Economies. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
                                                           
i Based on the experience of one of the authors as a teenager and young adult in socialist Hungary. 
ii Based on the experience of one of the author’s spouses as a teenager in socialist Romania. 
iii Shane (1994), 80. 
iv Goldman (1987), 35. 
v Based on the experience of one of the authors as a teenager and young adult in socialist Hungary. 
vi Based on the experience of one of the authors as a teenager and young adult in socialist Hungary. 
vii Based on conversations of one of the authors with Hungarian military officers participating in military 
exercises in the former Soviet Union. 
viii BBC 1989, SU/0616, November 17, 1989, p. B/8, quoted in Shane 1994, 69. 
ix Smith 1976, 41. 
x Goldman 1983, 104, referenced in Lebergott 1993, 29. 
xi Smith (1976), 43. 
xii The study defines tertiary education as follows: “Education programs offered to students who have 
successfully completed prerequisite studies at the upper secondary level. There is usually opportunity for 
post-secondary technical as well as university training. Program completion is marked by the awarding of a 
university degree or a recognized equivalent qualification.” (World Bank 2000, 136) 
  32